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BOOK REVIEWS
JUDICIAL LEGISLATION.

By Fred V. Cahill, Jr. New York: The

Ronald Press Company, 1952. Pp. ix, 164. $4.00.
The author of Judicial Legislation contrasts what he calls the
traditional theory of our legal system, namely, that judges can discharge their judicial function without legislating and that they ought
so to discharge it, with subsequently developed theories that judicial
legislation is both necessary and proper. The traditional theory, as
shown, was attacked for its inadequate explanation of our legal history
and as an imperfect governmental device to serve for the future. In
addition, we are reminded that
there has grown up an increasingly important body of legal
theory that holds that judges not only can legislate, but also
ought consciously to do so. Legal writers who hold these views
urge in effect that judges should cease to be merely the dispassionate oracles of the law and should assume an active role
in the creation of the legal rules themselves.'
The theories of the judicial function propounded by Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. and the various schools of jurisprudence, are examined
with special reference to "sociological jurisprudence" and "legal realism." The examination is made in an interesting manner. The book
contains good material, an abundance of useful notes and many shrewd
observations. However, it may not analyze sufficiently the reasons and
possible remedies for the confusion shown to exist in the theories
surveyed.
The apparent inconsistency of legal writers who approve "judicial
legislation" when the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to civil
rights is involved, and yet disapprove "writing into" the Fourteenth
Amendment the invalidation of legislation in the social and economic
fields, is cited but not reconciled.
The meaning of "judicial legislation" is shown to be ambiguous
and emotive. The term is used both to condemn and to praise. Another
inescapable conclusion, though not explicit, is that "judicial legislation"
involves a confused concept. The concept touches on, but does not aid
1. P. 3.
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in bringing into focus, the many problems involved in the constitutional
assignment of functions to courts and legislative bodies.
Let us examine the various meanings of "judicial legislation." The
words may imply a wrongful exercise by the courts of a power constitutionally assigned only to the legislature, thus charging a usurpation
by the judiciary. The charge of usurpation assumes that the judge can
ascertain when his action is within the limits of the proper exercise
of the judicial function and when his action would infringe on the
legislative function. "Judicial legislation" also may be applied to a
court's activity in praise of what the court has done and said. Far
from condemning judicial action on the ground that it amounts to
"judicial legislation," and hence is wrong, it is argued that a court
cannot exercise properly its judicial function without legislating, and
that it is wrong to condemn a court for doing that which it must do.
Although it is also here assumed to be possible for a judge to recognize
when a choice of decision would or would not be "judicial legislation,"
the importance of recognition and proper classification is not stressed
as a means of avoiding usurpation by the judiciary. Rather, the recognition and proper classification is sought on the assumption that the
quality of the judicial legislation will be increased or the extent thereof
reduced, if the judge does his "judicial legislating" consciously and
intentionally.
The author considers that the empirical basis of criticisms of the
traditional view is best understood from "the constitutional and legal
problems faced by the United States in its transition toward the positive
or service state."'2 A constitutional crisis is seen to have occurred in
the conflict between the legislative response to the development of our
industrial society and the judicial veto of important aspects of that
response. In the area of constitutional law, we are told, the legal theory
of the modern state has resulted in a return of the judicial function
to the narrowest possible boundaries, and that although there appears
to be no tendency to relinquish the right of judicial review, the
tendency has been for the courts to "solve" the problem of judicial
legislation by ceasing to legislate judicially. This is seen as a return to
the original concept of judicial function, with the possible difference
that modem judges, more aware of the dangers of their position, will
be less likely than their predecessors to read their unconscious predilections into the law. Such a "solution" need not involve an acceptance
of the principle (.which Holmes is cited as supporting) that a statute,
2. P. 47.
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being the product of a legislative majority, indicates a degree of popular
acceptance that should be binding on the courts. The author observes
that even Holmes apparently departed from this view in the area of
civil rights, particularly in cases of freedom of speech and expression.
The legislature thus again becomes the principal agency of change
in adapting government to the problems of modern society.
Even now, however, it can be said that the Constitution
has in the past few years fundamentally changed from a judicially defined Constitution to one that is in important areas to a
far greater degree an instrument of legislative definition. Once
again the nature of our institutions has changed. But, as has
been the case in the past, that change
has been brought about
3
by the use of the judicial power.
"Sociological jurisprudence" and "legal realism," though charged with
being stronger in criticism than in constructive force, are given some
credit for the changes brought about in judicial attitudes.
"Judicial legislation" is seen as related not only to the constitutionality of statutes, but also to the entire field of judicial review. In
modern juristic theory, the author states, the legal system ceases to be
a social adjustment and becomes a process by which social adjustment
is secured. Law becomes an instrument of social ends, and every court
decision is positive in the sense that it lends the support of the state
to some interest that is seeking its protection. This concept, the author
believes, goes far towards undermining the notion that law is an impartial arbiter arising in some undetermined fashion above the interests
of society. Law is thus not a fixed system, and becomes liable to
evaluation in terms of its social policy in a way that was not formerly
possible.
Recent legal theory is deemed affected by the emergence of the
concept of the modern state as predicated upon social change and the
conscious use of governmental power. Because issues of governmental
power are or had become judicial questions, the need for a new theory
of the judicial function became acute. The problem to which the
modern jurist addresses himself is viewed as one
to devise a philosophy of judicial action that would induce
the courts either to accomplish the necessary changes or, at the
very least, to refrain from blocking the efforts of others to
accomplish them. 4
3. P. 69.
4. P. 149.
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We are told that modern jurisprudence has attempted to accomplish
both by the legislative theory of the judicial function, which
holds that courts should be sensitive to legislative considerations both in construing the powers of other agencies of governareas of the law tradiment and in the development of those
tionally in the keeping of the courts.5
Apparently this view has not displaced the traditional theory, for
the author observes that one of the most interesting aspects of modern
American jurisprudence is that, although there is general dissatisfaction
with the traditional conception of the judicial function, no commonly
accepted theory has grown up to replace it. It would be possible, he
recognizes, to accept modern criticisms of the nature and functions of
law without necessarily arriving at a legislative theory of the judicial
function. In many cases the need was felt to reduce that function by
noting when it was taking place. On such a basis, the so-called modern
theory of judicial legislation need not involve an implication that the
judges are being urged to usurp the legislative function. Rather it can
mean that they are urged to undertake a necessary function that would
otherwise either go undone or, given the necessities of the legislative
process, would not be well done. Yet we are warned that the advocate
of "judicial legislation," by suggesting legislative action by non-elected
and formally unresponsible agencies, comes close to questioning the
necessity of electoral processes as we now understand them.
The author seems to agree that in fact our judges have engaged in
"judicial legislation." He apparently assumes that "judicial legislation"
is a meaningful term and chides the theorists by pointing out that surely
there was no necessity for the flood of books and articles to tell the
judges that theory justified their doing what they were already doing.
Whether and how it is possible for a judicial act to be both judicial
and legislative, or whether the concept "judicial legislation" is helpful,
are not investigated. The author is concerned with pointing out the
inadequacies and ambiguities of current legal theories. He complains
that despite the avowed intent of the current legal theorists to inform
the legal process with more precise knowledge, none of them
has made any quantitative statements about either the amount
of judicial legislation he favored or the extent of the changes
he expected to accomplish thereby. 6
5. Ibid.
6. P. 157.
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The nature of the quantitative statements which the author thought
might have been made, is not indicated.
The author notes that the basic failure of the newer jurisprudence
is that, thus far, it has failed to achieve any real clarification of the
position of the courts in our total governmental structure, and that it
has failed to present a scheme for the solution of the problems that now
face us. He concludes that the invalidation of legislation under broad
constitutional phraseology has not entirely disappeared and that thus
far the efforts of some judges to show that they are not "legislating"
in the constitutional field somehow fail to carry conviction.
That legislative activity should be most strongly suggested
in the very field where the theory seems most firmly opposed
to it does not render any easier the problems of evaluating the
influence of either legal realism or sociological jurisprudence.7
It is observed that despite the attempts of theorists to broaden
the scope of jurisprudence, with few exceptions they approach the
problem of judicial function as if it were a legal problem exclusively.
Issues of the location and control of the legislative power and the
position of the expert in government are seen as more important while
conflicts with the formal theory of the separation of powers are not
deemed of great importance.8 The separation of powers is considered not
an end in itself, but only a means to another end. Of greater importance,
we are told, is the problem of the efficiency of the courts as legislative
bodies. The Brandeis brief, as a technique for keeping the courts informed when they are engaged in judicial legislation, is no guaranty of
satisfactory results unless taken together with the appropriate presumption of constitutionality. The author contends that if this is
honored, the Brandeis brief is rendered unnecessary; that in any event
the Brandeis brief, even as restricted, was most prominently a constitutional law device and in an area in which the modern theory tended
generally to try to eliminate "judicial legislation."
The assertion that the judges are representative of the deep and
enduring desires of the American people as they are expressed in our
Constitution, is met with the statement that if this is true there remains
the problem arising from the determination of which values are permanent and which are less permanent, and that the sudden recourse to
7. P. 155.
8. Compare the complaint by a member of the Bar, that an article allegedly con-

demning the constitutional separation of federal powers was a "masterpiece of un-Americanism unworthy of any American lawyer or teacher of American Law." 38 A.B.A.J.
611 (1952).

BOOK REVIEWS
"permanent values" suggests a return to the "constitutionalism of former
days."' If the values to be represented by the judiciary are to be selected
by the judiciary, where, he asks rhetorically, has there been a gain in
constitutional theory.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's observations that judges do not hold
press conferences, that they are responsible to no one for their tenure,
that they deliberate in secret and announce the results of their deliberations
in special language that requires interpretation before the beneficiaries
of their actions can understand it, are recalled, with the comment
[b] ut to say that widening the legislative power of a branch of
government so constituted would be to strengthen popular
control over government is, on its face at least, somewhat
startling. It is difficult to avoid concluding that the final recourse is, indeed, the judge.' 0
The author's conclusion that an accurate appraisal of judicial
power is an indispensable first step toward either its modification or
intelligent public acceptance, either of which will stand as an advance
in the achievement of responsible government in the United States,
does not seem debatable. Moreover, the author's modest hope that his
book will contribute to an appreciation that the underlying issue with
reference to the judicial function has been governmental in a broad
sense, should be deemed accomplished. However, his suggestion that
the whole question of popular control of legislative process has been
involved seems true but inadequate.
This reviewer has suggested that the concept of "judicial legislation" itself may be confusing. Of course, the author is not responsible
for that concept. It has a long tradition.
Although little proof is required to support the thesis that judicial
action frequently has many aspects of similarity to legislative action, it
would seem equally true that there are many points of dissimilarity.
It should be recognized that the relation between judicial and legislative
actions cannot be expressed without finding a common denominator
between them.:" "Rule-making" may be such a common denominator.
Traditional legal theory assumes that the constitution, legislation,
and the "principles" of the common law provide a sufficient reservoir
9. P. 159.

10. Ibid.
11. See NORTHROP,

THE LoGic OF THE SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES

77 (1948).
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of rules to enable the judge to decide every case. Hence the judge need
not "make" rules. As the author observes, his only functions within
the assumptions of the traditional theory are discovery and deduction,
and the only way in which the system can be extended is by analogy.
On the other hand, constitutional conventions and legislative bodies are
recognized rule-enacting agencies. Legislation by a legislative body,
whatever else it also may be, is avowedly and intentionally a statement
of rules to indicate how government will respond to conduct described in
the legislation. Rules, as such, become the principal visible products
of legislative bodies. Although rules are also formulated by the courts,
such formulation is a by-product of the judicial function. However
important the by-product is, and certainly it is very important, in considering when a court has abused its proper function in the creation
of rules, it is necessary to consider the context in which the judicial ruleproduction takes place.
There usually is no complaint of usurpation by the judiciary if, in
deciding cases not governed by clear precedents or clear statutory or
constitutional language, the court announces no rules but merely decides
for the "plaintiff" or for the "defendant." If, however, the court goes
beyond announcing its decision and states rules as "reasons" for its
action, then, and usually only then, is the charge of usurpation by the
judiciary reasonably possible. The author recognizes that the charge
of usurping legislative power arises in cases in which the language of
the constitution or the statute is not "clear." Presumably he would
agree that the charge is not usually made when a court's decision is
based on a precedent "on all fours."
Among the early cases of alleged "judicial legislation," is Marbuiry
v. Madison.1 2 Here the rule was formulated that the Supreme Court
of the United States had the power to hold a statute of Congress unconstitutional. Applying the rule, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a statute purporting to authorize the Court to issue writs of
mandamus. Whether it was proper that a rule with regard to the
power of the Court to declare an Act of Congress unconstitutional be
formulated in order to support the judgment dismissing plaintiff's
motion for a writ of mandamus, was the subject of long debate. It is
clear that the judgment for the defendant could have been given by the
Supreme Court without invoking such a rule. The case is mentioned
not on any issue as to whether the rule announced by the court was a
correct interpretation of the Constitution, but to illustrate that the
12. 1 Cranch 137 (U.S. 1803).
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question whether an instance of judicial rule-making is a usurpation of
legislative power may depend on whether the particular rule-making is
a necessary or perhaps even a proper part of the justification for the
decision.
The analyses of numerous scholars have shown that the assumption
that judges need only apply pre-existing rules by logical implication
simply is not a true description of method for the "new" case. 13 Rulemaking by judges 'can come about not from any desire on their part to
legislate, but from the necessity and requirement of our legal system.
Under a constitutional system, it is assumed that no governmental
action should be arbitrary whether the action is taken by the courts,
the legislature, or the executive. Each governmental action is expected
to be an instance of a rule.' 4 When only one adequate rule "pre-exists,"
the requirement can be met easily. When, after the determination of
the facts, logical implication from a previously formulated rule is not
possible, a rule must be formulated when the governmental action is
taken. When no adequate rule exists to determine the decision, the
judge in deciding the new case must generalize his action and state the
rule of which his decision is an instance.
Two different, though related, assumptions are involved in the socalled traditional legal theory. These are: (1) that all cases can be
decided rationally without the formulation of new rules; (2) the judges
ought to decide the cases brought before them without invoking rules
which did not previously "exist." Asking whether judges should "legislate," is not the same as asking whether judges rationally can decide all
cases without sometimes formulating new rules or asking whether old
rules should be discarded and new rules formulated.
What is called "jtidicial legislation," as a condemnatory term, may
be a decision accompanied by an opinion containing rules which are
challenged. The impropriety alleged may be that a new rule was announced though the case could have been decided by an old rule.
The theory that judges do not legislate can be maintained as a
formally correct statement if the term "legislate" is defined to include
only rule-making by legislative bodies. Although such a definition
13. See COHEN & COHEN, READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
445 ff. (1951); compare BURKE, A GRAmmAR OF MOTIVES 104 (1945)--"For it is
always a matter of casuistry to decide whether you will treat the modification of a
principle as an 'extension of' the principle or a 'deviation from' it. . .
14. See John Dickinson, My Credo about the Law in My PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 91,

95 (1941).
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does not solve the difficult problems arising out of separate judicial and
legislative agencies of government, it should promote clarity in dealing
with such problems. Courts, when deciding cases not governed by clearcut precedents, and legislative bodies in their day-to-day functioning,
should both be seen as rule-enacting agencies of government.
The rule-enactments of both courts and legislative bodies are subject
to constitutional requirements. The fact that under our constitutional
system the courts have the "last word" does not mean that there need
be a return to the "constitutionalism of former days," in the sense of
arbitrary disregard of legislative rule-making prerogatives. Judicial rule
enactment must remain not only "interstitial," but must be justified
through the application of suitable criteria.
Just as no single criterion for "truth" can be given, so also no
single criterion can be given for what constitutes justification for the
formulation by a court of "new" rules to support its decision. Yet
the distinction between judicial and legislative action remains a valuable
one. It should not be discarded because of the profound difficulties of
applying it in borderline cases. Nor should the problem be confused
with any current attitude of the courts or the legislatures toward social
changes. 15 Calling a decision "judicial legislation" because it partakes
in a sense of both, can be as destructive of clarity as calling an altruistic
action "selfish" because the altruistic person is pleased with his altruism.
If the inevitability of rule-making by the judiciary for some cases
is granted, the problem for judicial theory seems to become one of developing the criteria for applying the division of labor imposed by the
Constitution. The justification for judicial rule-making may depend
on the areas of subject-matter in which it is exercised. For example,
when dealing with civil rights cases and the enforcement of provisions
of the Constitution obviously not dependent upon the will of a particular
legislative majority, it would seem improper to condemn judicial rules
even though judicial rule-making is required. The fact that the legislature has spoken contrary to the requirements the judiciary deems
applicable may be a sound reason for judicial interference in some
cases. On the other hand, broad areas exist in which it would seen]
15. Morris R. Cohen, though contending in 1912 that the American doctrine of
government by three coordinate branches was then "the bulwark of our economically
regnant classes," noted that the doctrine originated in certain logical considerations in
Aristotle and was copied into the American Constitution not because of any class interests, but because of the imposing character of the learning in Montesquieu in his
Spirit of Laws. COHEN, REASON AND LAW 135 (1950).
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proper for the judiciary to defer to the legislature's rule, even though
such rule is deemed unwise by the court.
The need for judicial rule-making in appropriate cases, as well as
the requirements of representative government and of the maintenance
oi the values which are deemed by the judiciary to be prescribed by the
Constitution, must be recognized. It necessarily will remain true under
our judicial system that to a very great extent we are dependent on the
self-restraint of the judiciary itself. Yet the self-restraint should not be
considered a matter of grace. Better formulation by the judiciary of
the broad rules under which its rule-making may proceed properly seems
desirable. The problem which the author sees of making "an accurate
appraisal of the nature of the judicial power" perhaps may include
determining the types of cases requiring judicial rule-making and
formulating the criteria to be applied to determine when judicial rulemaking is justified. It seems doubtful whether this task can be accomplished apart from the philosophical and psychological implications of
the doctrine of separation of powers as a governmental device.
JAMES L. MAGRISH*
* Member of the Ohio and District of Columbia Bars and Lecturer on Jurisprudence, University of Cincinnati.

